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Optimal design and -concavity
Abstract. Some of the most beautiful results in mechanism design depend
crucially on Myersons (1981) regularity condition. E.g., the second-price
auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution
is regular. This paper o¤ers two main results. First, an interpretation of
regularity is developed in terms of being the next to fail. Second, using
expanded concepts of concavity, a tight su¢ cient condition on the density
function is formulated. New examples of parameterized distributions are
shown to be regular. Applications include standard design problems, optimal
reserve prices, the analysis of bidding data, and multidimensional types.
Keywords and Phrases. Virtual valuation, Regularity, Generalized con-
cavity, Prékopa-Borell Theorem, Mechanism design.
JEL-Codes. D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; D44 - Auctions;
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; C16 - Specic Distributions.
1. Introduction
Some of the best-known results in the theory of mechanism design require
that the underlying type distribution be regular. For example, the second-
price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only under the condi-
tion of regularity.1 It is therefore of some interest to clarify the meaning and
scope of the assumption. Formally, regularity says that the virtual valuation,
Jf (x) = x  1  F (x)
f(x)
, (1)
is strictly increasing in the type x, where f and F , respectively, denote the
density and distribution function of the type distribution.2
A simple way to ensure regularity is to impose that the hazard rate of the
type distribution,
f (x) =
f(x)
1  F (x) , (2)
is monotone increasing. This approach has been found useful mainly for
two reasons. First, the hazard rate allows an immediate interpretation as
a conditional likelihood of failure.3 Second, distributions with log-concave
densities are known to possess a monotone hazard rate.4
However, the hazard rate condition will often be more restrictive than nec-
essary. For example, the log-normal distribution does not possess a monotone
1Cf. Myerson [15]. When the type distribution is not regular, the optimal mechanism
will typically entail conditional minimum bids, see Maskin and Riley [13].
2Equivalently, the marginal revenue of a monopolist facing inverse demand p = F 1(1 
q) is strictly declining in output. See Bulow and Roberts [5].
3Indeed, if F (x) is the probability that a machine will fail before time x, then the
hazard rate is the instantaneous probability of failure, given that the machine has not
failed before time x. See, e.g., Barlow and Proschan [3].
4See, e.g., An [1]. This result can be used to identify many parameterized examples
of regular type distributions. Specically, as Bagnoli and Bergström [2] show, regularity
holds for the uniform, normal, exponential, logistic, extreme value, Laplace, Maxwell,
and Rayleigh distributions. With restrictions to parameters, this list extends to power,
Weibull, Gamma, Chi-Squared, Chi, and beta distributions.
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hazard rate (cf. Figure 1), but will still be regular unless heavily skewed.5
Thus, imposing the hazard rate condition not only curtails the strength of
theoretical results, but also restricts unnecessarily the range of distributional
assumptions in empirical work.
The present paper o¤ers two main results. The rst is a statistical inter-
pretation of regularity. More specically, we characterize the assumption in
terms of the probability of being the next to fail, conditional on not having
failed before. The second main result is a su¢ cient criterion on the den-
sity that is substantially tighter than log-concavity. With the help of that
criterion, new examples of parameterized distributions can be shown to be
regular.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews mathe-
matical prerequisites. An interpretation of regularity is developed in Section
3. In Section 4, we prove a general characterization of distributions that
possess monotone virtual valuations. A tight criterion on the density is de-
rived and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 outlines some applications. An
Appendix deals with examples of parameterized distributions.
2. Mathematical tools
This section reviews some mathematical concepts and results that will be
used in the analysis.
2.1. Generalized concavity
A function g  0 on RN is called -concave, for  6= 0, if the set Xg =
fx 2 RN : g(x) > 0g is convex, and g= is concave on Xg. For  = 0,
5In fact, our results imply that the log-normal distribution is regular provided that
skewness is smaller than (e2 + 2)
p
e2   1  23:73.
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the denition is extended by the requirement that g must be log-concave.6
For a twice di¤erentiable g > 0, the condition of -concavity is equivalent to
g(x)g00(x)  (1  )g0(x)2.
One can show that higher values of  correspond to more stringent vari-
ants of concavity. In particular, log-concavity is more stringent than -
concavity for any  < 0. We call a function g strongly -concave if g is
0-concave for some 0 > .
Among alternative notions of concavity, the denition above is highlighted
by the fact that concavity properties are passed on from densities to integrals.
Theorem 2.1. (Prékopa-Borell) Let some -concave density g(x) on RN
be given, where  >   1
N
. Then
G(z) =
Z
fx2RN :xNzg
g(x1; :::; xN)dx1:::dxN (3)
is b-concave with b = 
1+N
.
For a helpful discussion of this result, see Caplin and Nalebu¤ [6]. Obviously,
the simplest version of the Prékopa-Borell Theorem says that if g(x1)  0
is -concave for some  >  1, then G(z) = R z 1 g(x1)dx1 is b-concave withb = 
1+
.
2.2. Minimal conditions for monotonicity
A smooth function is monotone increasing provided that its rst derivative
is never negative. Here is a generalization to functions that are not di¤eren-
tiable. For a function g, write g+(x) = lim sup"!0+
1
"
(g(x+ ")  g(x)) for the
right-hand upper Dini derivative at x.
6This is the denition used in the economics literature since Caplin and Nalebu¤ [6, 7].
E. Dierker [8] is an early application of generalized concavity in the economics literature.
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Theorem 2.2. Assume that
lim sup
"!0+
g(x  ")  g(x)  lim sup
"!0+
g(x+ ") (4)
at any x, that g+(x)  0 a.e., and that g+(x) >  1 except possibly at a
countable set. Then g is monotone increasing.
This result is Theorem 7.3 in Saks [18, Ch. VI].7 Note that (4) holds if g is
right-continuous and upper semi-continuous.
3. An interpretation of regularity
The analysis starts from an observation due to McAfee and McMillan [12]
saying that in the smooth case, regularity is equivalent to the strict con-
vexity of 1=(1   F ). For a direct proof of this fact, assume that F is twice
di¤erentiable. Then
@Jf (x)
@x
=
@
@x
(x  1  F (x)
f(x)
) = 1 +
f(x)2 + (1  F (x))f 0(x)
f(x)2
. (5)
However,
@2
@x2
1
1  F (x) =
@
@x
f(x)
(1  F (x))2 =
(1  F (x))f 0(x) + 2f(x)2
(1  F (x))3 , (6)
i.e., the respective signs of J 0f and (1=(1  F ))00 coincide.
It apparently went unnoticed that this characterization implies the fol-
lowing statistical interpretation of regularity. There is a large number M of
machines which fail one after another at rate f . Pick one machine from the
population, and assume it had been functional up to time x. By the law of
large numbers, there are aboutM(1 F (x)) machines left. Hence, the likeli-
hood for the chosen machine to be the next to fail is l(x)  1=M(1  F (x)).
7See also the discussion following the theorem.
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Call the rate at which the likelihood l(x) grows over time the zoom rate.
Then regularity requires the zoom rate to be strictly increasing over time.8
4. A generalization
So far, we assumed that the density function is di¤erentiable. However, this
may be restrictive, e.g., when the distribution is a mixture or the result of
endogenous decisions. To incorporate such possibilities, we will now replace
smoothness by a somewhat weaker assumption. Obviously, this section can
be skipped by readers interested only in the main results.
Consider a density f  0 on some interval X. Clearly, there is no loss in
assuming that f is strictly positive everywhere in the interior of X. Indeed,
if f(x) = 0 at some interior point, then Jf (x) =  1, and Jf cannot be
increasing. We will say that f satises the Cantor-Lebesgue condition (CL) if
f is right-continuous in the interior ofX, upper semi-continuous, and satises
f
+
>  1 except possibly at a countable set. This condition is obviously very
weak. For example, it is satised for right-continuous, piecewise di¤erentiable
densities that do not possess downward jumps.9
8Here is a somewhat more rigorous argument. Let m  1 denote the number of
machines that are still working at time x. Then
l(x) =
MX
m=1
1
m

M   1
m  1

(1  F (x))m 1F (x)M m
=
1
M(1  F (x))
MX
m=1

M
m

(1  F (x))mF (x)M m
=
1  F (x)M
M(1  F (x)) :
Therefore, for x kept constant, the productM(1 F (x))l(x) converges to unity asM !1.
Further, one can check that @l=@x  f(x)=M(1 F (x))2. This follows from di¤erentiating
the precise expression for l(x) derived above.
9Monteiro and Svaiter [14] study optimal design for arbitrary distributions. For ex-
ample, the support of the distribution may have gaps, and there may be mass points.
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The following auxiliary result can be seen as a generalization of the
smooth characterization of regularity. Note, however, that it concerns weakly
increasing virtual valuations.
Lemma 4.1. Let f > 0 be a density on some interval X, and assume that
condition (CL) holds. Then, Jf (x) is nondecreasing if and only if 1=(1  
F (x)) is convex.
Proof. The right-hand upper Dini derivative of Jf (x) = x  (1 F (x))=f(x)
is given by
J
+
f (x) = 1 + lim sup
"!0+
1
"

 1  F (x+ ")
f(x+ ")
+
1  F (x)
f(x)

(7)
= 1 + lim sup
"!0+
1
f(x+ ")

F (x+ ")  F (x)
"
+
+
1  F (x)
f(x)
f(x+ ")  f(x)
"

. (8)
Clearly, the derivative of F is a.e. well-dened with F 0 = f . Hence, noting
that f is right-continuous,
J
+
f (x) = 2 +
(1  F (x))f+(x)
f(x)2
(9)
a.e. in X. Let #f (x) = f(x)=(1   F (x))2. Then the right-hand upper Dini
derivative of #f (x) is
#
+
f (x) = lim sup
"!0+
1
"

f(x+ ")
(1  F (x+ "))2  
f(x)
(1  F (x))2

(10)
=
1
(1  F (x))2 lim sup"!0+

f(x+ ")  f(x)
"
+
+
f(x)
(1  F (x))2
(1  F (x))2   (1  F (x+ "))2
"

. (11)
Obviously, there is no role for regularity under such general conditions.
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Hence,
#
+
f (x) =
f
+
(x)(1  F (x)) + 2f(x)2
(1  F (x))3 (12)
a.e. in X. Comparing (9) and (12) shows that J
+
f (x) and #
+
f (x) share the
same sign a.e. in X.
Only if.Assume that Jf is monotone. Then J
+
f  0 on X, and there-
fore, #
+
f (x)  0 a.e. in X. An inspection of (11) shows that #f satises
condition (CL). Hence, by Theorem 2.2, #f is nondecreasing. Thus, the
integral 1=(1  F (x)) is convex.
If. Conversely, assume that 1=(1   F (x)) is convex. Then the left
derivative of 1=(1 F (x)) is well-dened in the interior of X and monotone.
But a.e. in X, the left derivative of 1=(1   F (x)) is given by #f . Thus,
#
+
f (x)  0 a.e. in X. As shown above, this implies J
+
f (x)  0 a.e. in X. One
can check using (8) that Jf satises condition (CL). Therefore, by another
application of Theorem 2.2, Jf is monotone increasing. 
5. A condition on the density
In this section, we apply the Prékopa-Borell theorem to derive a tight cri-
terion for regularity on the underlying density function. To deal with strict
monotonicity, and to allow for modications of the regularity assumption, we
will write
Jf (x; a; b) = ax  b  F (x)
f(x)
, (13)
where a; b 2 R. Obviously, Jf (x; 1; 1)  Jf (x).
Theorem 5.1. Let f > 0 be a density on some interval X, and a >  1.
Then Jf (x; a; b) is weakly increasing in x [strictly increasing in x] for any
8
b 2 [0; 1] if f is -concave [strongly -concave] for  =   a
1+a
. In particular,
Jf (x) is strictly increasing if f is strongly ( 12)-concave.
Proof. Assume that f is (  a
1+a
)-concave for some a >  1. Consider the
mirror image density g(y) = f( y). Obviously, also g is (  a
1+a
)-concave. By
Theorem 2.1, the integral G(y) = 1  F ( y) is ( a)-concave, and so is 1 
F (x). Since f must be continuous inX, with nite right derivative, condition
(CL) holds. Therefore, in straightforward extension of Lemma 4.1, Jf (x; a; 1)
is nondecreasing. Similarly, Jf (x; a; 0) is nondecreasing since F (x) = 1  
G( x) is ( a)-concave. The unbracketed part of the theorem follows now
from noting that Jf (x; a; b) is linear in b. If f is even strongly (  a1+a)-concave
for some a >  1 then, by the rst part of the proof, Jf (x; a0; b) is weakly
increasing in x for some a0 2 ( 1; a). Hence, Jf (x; a; b) = Jf (x; a0; b) + (a 
a0)x is strictly increasing in x. 
Thus, strong ( 1
2
)-concavity is su¢ cient for regularity. Since any log-concave
density is strongly ( 1
2
)-concave, Theorem 5.1 clearly implies the conven-
tional log-concavity criterion.10
To test the power of the square root criterion, we applied it to various
examples of parameterized distributions that do not allow a log-concave den-
sity.11 As Table I shows, regular design is feasible in particular for the log-
normal, Pareto, log-logistic, Student, Cauchy, F, beta prime, mirror-image
Pareto, inverse gamma, inverse chi-squared, and Pearson distributions, where
10Theorem 5.1 can also be applied if the density function has nitely many convex kinks
and jump discontinuities. In such cases, one requires strong (  12 )-concavity of f in each
smooth segment, and strong ( 1)-concavity of F just left of critical points. For a proof,
one constructs a strongly (  12 )-concave extension of the density right of the critical point.
The details are omitted.
11See the Appendix for details.
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constraints on the parameters typically ensure that these distributions are
not too much skewed. Conversely, Table II lists various distributions that
lack a strongly ( 1
2
)-concave density function. Most of those are not regular
(i.e., exhibit either J 0f  0, J 0f < 0, or mixed results), which illustrates the
tightness of the criterion.12
6. Applications
This section illustrates the use of Theorem 5.1 in specic settings.
6.1. Standard mechanism design. Here are three immediate applications.
First, the revenue-maximizing mechanism in Myerson [15] is a second-price
auction with reserve price if the density of types is strongly ( 1
2
)-concave.
Second, an optimal trading mechanism exists in Myerson and Satterthwaite
[16] if the buyers virtual valuation and the sellers virtual cost Jf (x) =
x+ F ()
f()
are both increasing. Again, a strongly ( 1
2
)-concave density su¢ ces.
Finally, optimal regulation discriminates between cost types in Baron and
Myerson [4] if + (1 )F ()
f()
is increasing in , where  is the policy weight
of monopoly. It su¢ ces that f is -concave for  >   1
2  .
6.2. Optimal reserve prices. Riley and Samuelson [17] show that the optimal
reserve price in a broad class of auctions can be found by setting the virtual
valuation equal to the sellers reservation value. The resulting equation has
a unique root if the type distribution is strongly ( 1
2
)-concave.
6.3. Empirical analysis of bidding data. Guerre et al. [10] prove that bids
in a rst-price auction can be rationalized as a Bayesian equilibrium under
12The square root criterion is indeed the tightest condition possible in terms of gener-
alized concavity. E.g., for  <   12 , take f(x) = x  1 on X = [1;1) with  =  +1 .
Note that f(x) is -concave. But Jf (x) = (1  1 )x is strictly decreasing since  < 1.
10
the independent private value paradigm if and only if x + 1
I
G(x)
g(x)
= Jg(x;I;0)
I
increases in x, where I is the number of bidders, while g and G, respectively,
denote density and distribution of bids. It su¢ ces that g is strongly -concave
with  =   I
1+I
.
6.4. Multidimensional types with externalities. An object is sold to one of N
buyers. With externalities, buyer is type is a vector (sii; s
i
 i) whose entries
specify the respective payo¤to the buyer in case some buyer obtains the good.
The distribution of buyer is type follows some density fi(sii; s
i
 i). Jehiel et
al. [11] show that the revenue-maximizing standard anonymous mechanism
that always transfers the object is a second-price auction with entry fee if a
modied regularity condition holds. Specically, for
g(z) =
Z
RN 1
fi(z +
1
N   1
X
j 6=i
sij; s
i
 i)ds
i
 i, (14)
the virtual valuation Jg needs to be increasing. By Theorem 5.1, it su¢ ces
that g is strongly ( 1
2
)-concave. But the change of variables in the argument
of fi e¤ective in (14) is an a¢ ne transformation of RN , which leaves gener-
alized concavity una¤ected. Therefore, using Theorem 2.1, the second-price
auction with entry fee is optimal if all fi are strongly (  1N+1)-concave.
Appendix. Parameterized distributions
This appendix outlines the derivations underlying Tables I and II. The main
tool is the following smooth criterion for -concavity.
Lemma A.1. Let f > 0 be twice continuously di¤erentiable on X, with
a discrete set X1 over which f 0(x) = 0. Then, for nite , the function f
is -concave if and only if rf (x)    @2@x2 ln f(x)=( @@x ln f(x))2   for all
11
x 2 X nX1.
Proof. A straightforward calculation shows that rf (x) = 1 f(x)f 00(x)=f 0(x)2.
Hence, rf (x)   if and only if f(x)f 00(x)  (1 )f 0(x)2, provided f 0(x) 6= 0.
By continuity, this proves the assertion. 
Lemma A.1 reduces the determination of the global concavity parameter 
to the solution of a straightforward minimization problem. For convenience,
explicit expressions of rf (x) are documented in Table I.
The following criterion is useful for identifying distributions for which
Jf (x) is not increasing.
Lemma A.2. Let f > 0 be di¤erentiable on X. Assume that f 0(x) is
negative and bounded away from zero in a neighborhood of the lower boundary
of the support interval. Then Jf (x) is not increasing.
Proof. Clearly J 0f (x) = 2+f
0(x)(1 F (x))=f(x)2. But f(x) vanishes at the
lower boundary of X. 
We now use the results obtained so far to discuss selected examples of para-
meterized distributions. Unless noted otherwise, all parameters are strictly
positive.
Log-normal distribution. The square root criterion implies that Jf is
increasing for 2L  2. Since F is log-concave, Jf is increasing.
F distribution. The density is (  2
2+m2
)-concave if m1  2. Thus, Jf is
monotone increasing for m1;m2  2. For m1 < 2, Lemma A.2 applies. Since
F is log-concave (cf. Finner and Roters [9]), Jf is increasing.
Gamma and Chi distributions. Only the case c < 1 is interesting. By
Lemma A.2, Jf is not increasing. The density is decreasing, hence Jf is
12
increasing.
Log-logistic. Since 1=(1 F (x)) = 1+x, it follows that Jf is increasing if
and only if  > 1. Similarly, 1=F (x) = 1+ x  implies that Jf is increasing.
Inverse gamma distribution. By the square root criterion, Jf is monotone
increasing for   1. The density is log-concave for x  xM , and decreasing
for x  xM . Hence, Jf is increasing.
Beta distribution. Only the cases with  < 1 or ! < 1 are interesting. If
 < 1, Lemma A.2 applies. If  > 1 > !, then f is increasing, hence so is
Jf . The analysis for Jf is analogous.
Pearson distributions. The density solves the di¤erential equation f 0(x) =
f(x)(x xM)=(x) for xM 2 R and (x) = b0+b1x+b2x2, where b0; b1; b2 2 R.
We focus on distributions with unbounded support and such that (xM) < 0.
Then f is b2-concave. Both Jf and Jf are increasing provided that b2   12 .
The analysis of the Pareto, mirror image Pareto, power, Student, and
Weibull distributions is straightforward. The remaining distributions can be
seen as either transforms or special cases of examples already discussed.
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Figure 1. Regularity of the log-normal distribution.†  
† The figure shows density, hazard rate, and virtual valuation of a random 
variable whose logarithm follows a standard normal distribution.  
𝑓 
𝐽𝑓 
λ𝑓 
Name of  distribution 
Interval 
X 
P.d.f. 
f(x) 
C.d.f. 
F(x) 
Mode 
𝒙𝑴 
Local concavity 
rf (x) 
Global  
concavity  
ρ 
Any with log-concave 
density ˗ see Bagnoli and Bergström (2006, Table 1) ˗ ≥ 0 ≥ 0 
Pareto 𝛽 > 1  [1; ∞) 𝛽𝑥−𝛽−1 1 − 𝑥−𝛽 1 − 1
𝛽 + 1 − 1𝛽 + 1 
Log-normal 𝜎𝐿2 < 2  [0; ∞) ∝ 1𝑥 exp − ln 𝑥 − 𝜇𝐿 22𝜎𝐿2  * exp µL − σL2  𝜎𝐿2 1 − ln 𝑥/𝑥𝑀ln 𝑥/𝑥𝑀 2  −𝜎𝐿24  
Student’s t 𝑛 > 1  ℝ ∝ 1 + 𝑥2
𝑛
−
𝑛+1
2
 * 0 
𝑛 − 𝑥2
𝑛 + 1 𝑥2 − 1𝑛 + 1 
Cauchy ℝ 
1
𝜋 1 + 𝑥2  12 + arctan 𝑥𝜋  0 1 − 𝑥22𝑥2  − 12 
F distribution 
𝑚1,𝑚2 > 2  [0; ∞) ∝ 𝑥𝑚12 −1𝑚1𝑥 + 𝑚2 𝑚1+𝑚22  * (𝑚1 − 1)𝑚2𝑚1(𝑚2 + 2)  2𝑚2 + 2 𝑥𝑀(𝑥𝑀 + 𝑚2/𝑚1)(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑀)2 − 1  − 2𝑚2 + 2 
Mirror-image of 
Pareto 𝛽 > 1  (−∞;−1] 𝛽 −𝑥 −𝛽−1 −𝑥 −𝛽 -1 − 1𝛽 + 1 − 1𝛽 + 1 
Log-logistic 𝛽 > 1  [0; ∞) 𝛽𝑥𝛽−11 + 𝑥𝛽 2 11 + 𝑥−𝛽 𝛽 − 1𝛽 + 1 1/𝛽 𝛽2 − (1 + 𝛽)(𝑥𝛽 − 𝛽 + 1)2 (𝑥𝛽(𝛽 + 1) − 𝛽 + 1)2  − 1𝛽 + 1 
Inverse gamma 
𝛼 > 1  [0; ∞) exp −1/𝑥𝛤 𝛼 𝑥𝛼+1  * 11 + α 𝑥𝑀( (𝑥𝑀)2(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑀)2 − 1) − 1α + 1 
Inverse chi-squared 
𝜈 > 2  [0; ∞) 𝑥− 𝜈 2⁄ −12𝜈 2⁄ 𝛤 𝜈/2 exp − 12𝑥  * 12 + 𝜈 2𝑥𝑀( (𝑥𝑀)2(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑀)2 − 1) − 2𝜈 + 2 
Beta prime 𝛼,𝛽 > 1  [0; ∞) ∝ 𝑥𝛼−1 1 + 𝑥 −𝛼−𝛽 * α − 1
𝛽 + 1 1𝛽 + 1 𝑥𝑀(𝑥𝑀 + 1)(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑀)2 − 1  − 1𝛽 + 1 
Pearson 𝑏2 > − 12  − see the Appendix − 𝑏2 − χ(𝑥𝑀)(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑀)2 𝑏2 
Table I. Distributions with strongly − 1
2
-concave density function.† 
† The symbol ∝ indicates that the density function, for fixed parameters, is proportional to the term given in the table; for cumulative distribution functions marked 
with * , there is no closed-form representation. 
Name of distribution 
Interval  
X 
P.d.f. 
f(x) 
C.d.f. 
F(x) 
Values 
𝑱𝑱𝒇 
Costs 
?̅?𝑱𝒇 
Power 𝑐 < 1  [0; 1] 𝑐𝑥𝑐−1 𝑥𝑐 ≱ 0 > 0 
Weibull 𝑐 < 1  [0; ∞) 𝑐𝑥𝑐−1 exp −𝑥𝑐  1 − exp −𝑥𝑐  ≱ 0 > 0 
Gamma 𝑐 < 1  [0; ∞) 𝑥𝑐−1 exp −𝑥
Γ 𝑐
 * ≱ 0 > 0 
Chi-Squared 𝑐 < 2  [0; ∞) 𝑥 𝑐−2 2⁄ exp −𝑥 2⁄2𝑐 2⁄ Γ 𝑐 2⁄  * ≱ 0 > 0 
Chi 𝑐 < 1  [0; ∞) 𝑥𝑐−1 exp −𝑥2 2⁄2 𝑐−2 2⁄ Γ 𝑐 2⁄  * ≱ 0 > 0 
Beta 𝜈 < 1 𝑜𝑜 𝜔 < 1  [0; 1] ∝ 𝑥𝜈−1 1 − 𝑥 𝜔−1 * mixed mixed 
Arc-Sine [0; 1] 1
𝜋 𝑥 1 − 𝑥  2𝜋 arcsin 𝑥  ≱ 0 ≱ 0 
Pareto 𝛽 < 1  [1;  ∞) 𝛽𝑥−𝛽−1 1 − 𝑥−𝛽 < 0 > 0 
Log-normal 𝜎𝐿2 > 2  [0; ∞) ∝ 1𝑥 exp − ln 𝑥 − 𝜇𝐿 22𝜎𝐿2  * mixed  (num.) > 0 
Student’s t 𝑛 < 1  ℝ ∝ 1 + 𝑥2
𝑛
−
𝑛+1
2
 * 
≱ 0 
(num.) 
≱ 0 
(num.) 
F distribution 𝑚1 < 2 𝑜𝑜 𝑚2 < 2  [0; ∞)  ∝ 𝑥𝑚12 −1
𝑚1𝑥 + 𝑚2 𝑚1+𝑚22  * mixed (num.) > 0 
Mirror-image of Pareto 𝛽 < 1  (−∞;−1] 𝛽 −𝑥 −𝛽−1 −𝑥 −𝛽 > 0 < 0 
Log-logistic 𝛽 < 1  [0; ∞) 𝛽𝑥𝛽−11 + 𝑥𝛽 2 𝑥𝛽1 + 𝑥𝛽 < 0 > 0 
Inverse gamma 𝛼 < 1  [0; ∞) exp −1/𝑥
Γ 𝛼 𝑥𝛼+1
 * ≱ 0 (num.) > 0  
Inverse chi-squared 𝜈 < 2  [0; ∞) 𝑥− 𝜈 2⁄ −1
Γ 𝜈/2 exp − 12𝑥  * ≱ 0 (num.) > 0 
Beta prime 𝛼,𝛽 < 1  [0; ∞) ∝ 𝑥𝛼−1 1 + 𝑥 −𝛼−𝛽 * mixed (num.) > 0 
Pearson 𝑏2 < −12  - see the Appendix - mixed (num.) mixed (num.) 
Table II. Distributions without strongly −1
2
-concave density function.‡ 
‡ The symbol ∝ indicates that the density function, for fixed parameters, is proportional to the term given in the table; for cumulative distribution functions marked with * , there is no closed-form representation; 
the abbreviation “num.” indicates that the result has been obtained through a numerical analysis.  
